Search results for "Level of Effort"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
The dynamics of motivation, emotion, and task performance in simulated achievement situations
2020
Abstract This study aimed to examine associations between motivation, emotion, and task performance in simulated achievement situations. A group of sixth grade students (n = 190) completed an achievement task. Situational information on task value, success expectations, emotions, effort, task performance, and causal attributions was collected and information on subsequent academic achievement was obtained from school registers. The results showed, first, that high task value, high expectancy of success, and high positive emotions before a task contributed to a higher level of effort during the task. This, in turn, was related to better task performance. Second, high expectancy of success pr…
Written composition performance of students with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
2011
ABSTRACTAttention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is frequently associated with learning disabilities. The present study examined the written composition of children with ADHD, which depends to a large degree on continuous self-regulation and attentional control skills for organizing information and maintaining the level of effort. Fifty children with ADHD and 50 normally developing children, matched on age and IQ, were assessed using a composition writing task. The results contribute to prior research findings by showing that the children with ADHD performed significantly worse than the comparison groups on the majority of the planning, translation, and revision process measures usua…
Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? Influence costs and contract design
2013
We develop a principal–agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft behavioral signal (the supervision signal) about the agent's level of effort. In our model, the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal. These activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task. We show that the agent's ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly, the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the desig…